
"Once across the river, the Army of Northern Virginia's crippling lack of shoes began to tell as men's feet, used to the soft dirt roads of Virginia, were painfully cut and scraped as they marched on the hard, rock roads of Maryland. One soldier complained that while his heart was brave he was cursed with 'unpatriotic feet'." 1
Update (8-4-08 )
XIV. A. Scenario OOB Mod - 1st Manassas / 1st Bull Run - added Col. S. P. Heintzelman's Official Report link, BG D. Tyler's Official Report, BG Evans Official Report.
XIV. A. 4 Scenario 103 - A Manual Override to the 5-hex "Release" Routine
XIV. A. 5. 1st Manassas Historical Deployment Scenario v. 1.3 - text update, including a 2nd alternative option for balancing the "in command" morale-check bonus routine equation for both sides.
Update (6-8-08 )
I. A. 2. - Hex-side (FTH) Qualifiers
I. F. - Reserve Status - link to - Combat Effectiveness Recovery (XIII. C. )
II. F. 1. - Leader Escorts II.F.2 Provost Troops
XII. D. - Skirmish Formation Stacking / Movement
XII. D. - Skirmish Formation Fire Qualifiers
XII. E. - Skirmish Formation Melee Qualifiers
XII. F. - Skirmish Formation RBM Eligibility / Restrictions
IV. C. - Dismounted Skirmisher RBM
Appendix ii - Setup Options (Recommended)
Update and Addition (12-9-07 )
Skirmishers: XII. D. Fire Qualifier
Addition (10-12-07)
Update (9-24-07)
XI. Surrender! (Optional)
Update (8-31-07)
Appendix ii: Setup Options (Recommended)
Addition (8-7-07)
Appendix i: A Users Guide to ACW House Rule Essentials™
1. 1st Manassas Historical Deployment Scenario - ver. 1.3 (See XIV. A. for outline details)
Note: This the final fine-tuning adjustment of troop releases, including latest text file update.
2. ACW House Rule Fonts
Unzip (extract) to your [C:/] Windows / Fonts subdirectory if you wish to view ACW House Rule Essentials ™ as it is monitored from the bivouac's side of the creek.
ACW House Rule Essentials™ Site Map
Note: ACW House Rule Essentials™ is optimized for Internet Explorer. Minor format / spacing / font and other marginal irregularities have been noted in both Opera and Firefox browsers - don't know why or how to compensate for these. Recommended monitor screen display resolution: 1024 x 768 - 1280 x 1024 (best). If using "dial-up" access, please, be patient as small but numerous jpg's take their sweet time to load. Web site size: 2.47 MB ... give or take.
"I have no problem telling my designers to include your rules in the set they have under consideration and then with priority order established in that set, work towards implementation." --John Tiller (10-23-06)
Appendix i -- A Users Guide to ACW House Rule Essentials™
Appendix ii -- Setup Options (Recommended)
Appendix iii -- "Show Don't Tell" Wish List
Appendix iv -- Open Letter to John Tiller, 3-24-03
Appendix v -- A "Fair Exchange" (10-23-06 / 10-24-06)
Appendix vi -- References
The Day After: White Flag of Truce

Dunker Church--Antietam, September 18, 1862 2
ACW House Rule Essentials™ offers a challenging manual override for the determined intermediate to grumpier grognard player alike, who seek increased historical realism and color within the fixed code and generic scope of John Tiller's "Civil War Battles" [HPS] series of games.
Please, also see Appendix i: A Users Guide to ACW House Rule Essentials™ .
ACW House Rule Essentials™ targets
Note: Players are encouraged to edit, embellish, add, or subtract on-the-fly from any house rule as suits mutual gaming interests and specific scenario OOB manifests. All that is required is a cooperative keyboard.
ACW House Rule Essentials™ gratefully borrow from Richard Berg's evolving, grand-tactical GBACW™ boardgame series, specifically, Terrible Swift Sword ©1976 & ©1986, 2nd Ed., Rebel Sabres ©1988, First Blood - The First (& Second) Battle of Manassas ©1989, Dead of Winter ©1990, and River of Death ©1999. Additional sources include Battle Tactics of the Civil War by Paddy Griffith, ©1989, Fighting for the Confederacy by E.A. Alexander (ed. by Gary W. Gallagher) ©1989, The Civil War -- Time-Life Books, Inc. ©1984-85, The Library of Congress - Selected Civil War Photographs: Library of Congress - Selected Civil War Photographs, and as further cited in Appendix vi -- References .
Stacking refers to having more than one combat unit in a hex, a function more of tactical usage than how many men can be crammed into a space. --Richard Berg
The Regiment

"A regiment of ten companies, again the norm, would take up a 165-yard front. However, the usual
practice was to deploy two companies or 10 percent of the men from each company some 100-175
yards in advance of the regiment as a skirmish line." 15
General Rule: Units in different formations may not stack together. Stacking qualifiers are in effect at all times -- even -- and especially -- during the movement phase.
Note: Stacking qualifiers are scaled to complement Mr. Tiller's ACW map scale of 125 yards / 1000 maximum SP's per hex.
Example: Berg's map scale is 150 yards / hex (Dead of Winter). Mr. Tiller's Campaign series map scale is 125 yards p/hex. Stacking Limits for ACW House Rule Essentials™ is calculated by dividing Berg's stacking point (SP) limits (1200 SP's) by "1/6". Thus 1200 SP's in clear terrain in Berg's Dead of Winter becomes 1000 SP's, thereby complementing Mr. Tiller's unit / map scale.
Exception: A routed unit may ONLY stack with un-routed unit(s) if no other option exists. It must retreat to an unoccupied hex - or hex similarly occupied by routed units - as soon as one becomes available.
"I have reviewed your proposed hex-side fire limitation rules and will consider them as an optional rule in a future release." --John Tiller (2-26-03)
Yes (Thank You). "Show don't tell," 1861-1865
"Confederate dead lie [stacked] in heaps" 2

Bloody Lane, September 1862
ACW House Rule Essentials™ provides the essential Hex-side (FTH) equalizer on Stacking Limits (see Table I below). -- for an explanatory review, please, see "An Open Letter to John Tiller" (2-24-03).
ACW House Rule Essentials™ Table 1 (see below) also addresses careless gaps in Mr. Tiller's grossly generic stacking rules, which fail to make tactical distinctions between battle-line SP fire efficiency in clear terrain versus same in non-clear terrain hexes.
Hex-side SP Stacking Limits |
Clear / Fields |
Woods |
Orchards |
Marsh |
Town / City |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Max Inf / Dsmntd Cav SP's
+ Sections / Batteries |
1000
|
650 |
800 |
400 |
500 |
6/2 |
3/1 |
3/1 |
P |
2/1 |
|
Max Cav (Column) SP's
+ Sections / Batteries |
650
|
400 |
500 |
250 |
250 |
3/1
|
3/1 |
3/1 |
P |
2/1 |
|
Maximum Infantry / Dismounted
Melee SP's |
1000 |
650 |
800 |
400 |
500 |
Maximum Mounted Line 1
Melee SP's |
650 |
400 |
500 |
P |
250 |
| |
350 |
250 |
350 |
250 |
250 |
P=Prohibited
A (single) unit may always ignore Table I FTH terrain hex-side limits to target its SP fire through a single hex-side - if only because hardwired constraints foil any hope to actually "split" a unit's SP fire so as to cover more than one hex-side of Mr. Tiller's fixed 3 hex-side ZOC expedient.
With the above single unit hex-side limits in mind, ACW House Rule Essentials™ currently supports the following manual "split-fire" FTH override - please, see below - for larger single unit formations, aimed at tempering Mr. Tiller's otherwise un-tempered (missing) FTH limits.
Explanation: Mr. Tiller's maximum 1000 SP Fire-Through-Hexside (FTH) stacking limits not only challenges all known physical laws that govern finite space within limited time constraints, it's pure make-believe.
Permitting combat unit(s) and/or stacks to 'overstack' a single hexside, measuring 41.7 yds, twice in the same turn, no less -- i.e., both defensive and offensive fire phases - with a wall of unqualified small arms lead (1000 SP max) has long been condemned by House Rules as well as by attentive board / hex-based game designer(s) from the 1970's forward. Please, review Table I - Maximum Fire-Through-Hexiside Limits.
To contest Mr. Tilller's neglected (MIA or AWOL - take your pick) Fire-Through-Hexside Limits, current house rule abstractions will serve an essential manual override to compliment - again, please, be sure to review FTH Terrain Hex stacking limits: Table I. Also, see Open Letter to John Tiller."We Can Do Better."
EXAMPLES:
During a rather bloody Cedar Mountain(Campaign Anti-tank) fire phase -
---- Infantry in Woods may stack up to a maximum of 650 SP's - as per Table I .Thus with the above still in mind, no rebel regiment stacked in hex 22, 18 may combine SP's with another unit to execute fire through the same hex-side, because to do so would be a violation of FTH Limits in a woods hex as per Table 1 - not to mention, a general violation of the laws governing limited time within a finite space (doh!).
---- Fire-Through-Hexside (FTH) limits in woods is 250 SP's - as per Table I.
---- Units stacked in a hex must share the same Facing - I. E. (Optional).
Again with the above in mind, the USA 8th regiment may conduct one of the following four possible actions, during any [manual] defensive / offensive fire phase:---- The top-most unit in a hex must be targeted before the next unit stacked immediately beneath may be targeted as per Stacking Order - I.B. (General Rule)
---- Stacking Order may be ignored for any unit numbering 100 SP's or less stacked in a hex -- as per Stacking Order Exceptions I.B. 2. _c .
Notes:
An essential complement to Hex-side (FTH) SP limits (see Table I above).
U.S.A. Colonel Walker's Brigade
![]()
Stones River, January 2, 1863 3
General Rule: Only the top unit in a stack may be fired upon before unit(s) lying beneath - in descending order - may be targeted. The effects of stacking order within a targeted hex is significant, hence, may not be ignored. However, please, see exceptions (below).
EXAMPLE: An artillery "crew" may only be targeted after all top (front-line) combat units in a hex have been targeted first - but, see exception 'b' below.
Exceptions:
- Artillery "shot" (i.e., ordnance fire beyond a 3-hex "canister" range) ignore stacking order -- it may target any unit stacked in a hex.
- A unit fired upon may always ignore stacking order to "return fire" - but, only in its next friendly fire phase.
- Ignore stacking order for units numbering 100 SP's or less.
Definition: "Road Column" is defined as a single, contiguous (adjacent) string of units marching in column formation along a pike, road, or trail.
"Marching Two Abreast"

"12th Wisconsin Volunteers (approximately 1000 strong) march
22 miles in 6 hours from Quincy, Illinois to Hannibal, Missouri."
(January, 1862) 4
General Rule: Combat units marching in road column may not stack. A wagon shall be defined herein as a combat unit.
Note: Column units marching at the off-road movement rate may always stack up to the maximum stacking limits as per Table 1. This formation might, perhaps, be better described as "maneuver" / "shock" column (i.e., vs "road" column).
IMPORTANT:
"Final Council of War" --Shiloh, April 5th, 1862

[left to right: General's Beauregard, Polk, Breckinridge,
Johnston, Bragg, Hardee.] 4
General Rule: A Leader that ends his movement phase stacked in a hex may only stack with combat units subordinate to his command -- unless all units under his command have been eliminated, in which case he may stack with any unit.
This House Rule prohibits Mr. Tiller's unqualified permission to routinely stack leader units, willy-nilly, with combat units outside their command if only for the purpose of gaining the melee bonus.
IMPORTANT:
Caution! "Recon at Yur Own Risk, suh!" so the sign should read.
House Rules cannot guarantee the return of a high level commander's life or limb if found engaging in Stonewall-esque acts of reckless night-time intelligence gathering pursuits. Indeed, getting leaded by a fearsome hail of blind musket fire should always be considered a dispiriting possibility without troop-issued night-vision goggles, eh? You have been duly warned, General!
"The admonition that all units in the same hex must face in the same direction [within the context of a superimposed hex-movement-grid] is one that arises purely from a need to keep the game manageable. There is really no 'historical' reason why this should be a restriction, so if both players agree, feel free to ignore it. Be aware though, that it raises a host of tangential and entangling play questions that you are free to resolve on your own." --Richard Berg (Terrible Swift Sword)
Sherfy Farmhouse, July 2, 6:20 P.M. The Peach Orchard salient


Brig. Gen. Graham's 57th & 114th Pennsylvania Meade: General, I'm afraid you are too far out.
(Birney's Division), lie low for cover, facing a far worse Sickles: However, I will withdraw if you wish, sir.
fate (McClaws Division in the distance) to come. 5 Meade: I think it is too late. The enemy will not allow you. 5
General Rule: Units in a stack must face in the same direction at the end of the movement phase.
If a unit lacks sufficient MP's to meet the general facing requirement it may not stack in the same hex.
Exceptions:Reserve status permits the unimpeded use of Mr. Tiller's maximum stacking limits - overriding TABLE ITerrain Stacking Limits. A good example for placing units in Reserve Status would be Heth's Division, during the night following the first day's heavy fighting.
Please, see Combat Effectiveness Recovery (XIII. C.) for further historical application of Reserve Status.
General Rule: Combat units may be placed in Reserve Status at no MP cost at any time during the friendly movement phase.
Notes:
". . . But, the splendid vista did not afford a clear view
of the right and left flanks,
where the heaviest
fighting occurred." 2
General McClellan's uncertain HQ command 'vantage'

Pry House--Antietam, September 17, 1862 6
"A major problem, however, was that the techniques of staff work remained rather too personal - essentially verbal . . . but in the Civil War the lack of sufficient trained staff officers too often meant that the confirmation was left unwritten . . . The staff-work problem usually had a more serious effect upon offensive than defensive tactics . . . Orders went astray, conflicting chains of command interfered with each other, and golden opportunities were wasted." 16
"As miniature war gamers, we have far more knowledge and far more control over our troops than any historical commander has ever possessed. We tower over the battlefield like a 200 Foot General, taking in all and responding instantly." --The 200 Foot General (3-14-01)
"Controlling the The 200 Foot General does not mean reproducing staff procedure as a measure of battlefield efficiency. Instead, it means reproducing the many roadblocks to a commander's battlefield decision-making process. It means reproducing battlefield doubt.
". . . Working with board games actually put me in contact with a gentleman named Richard Berg . . . [who] stated that friction was necessary, because if you don't have something to control the The 200 Foot General, then Robert E. Lee will never stand a chance at Antietam . . . The other thing that he also put into perspective . . . never deprive the player of the opportunity to do something stupid. [laughter] So I always took that to heart." -- Colonel Bill Gray, The 200 Foot General (3-14-01).
![]()
Maj. Gen. Hooker (left) and Burnside Lee, Longstreet, and aide
Fredericksburg, December 13,1862 8 -- Marye's Heights, December 13,1862 8
ACW House Rule Essentials™ introduces Richard Berg's historically-abstracted 'friendly' "Fog of War" modeling as best as can be mustered, given the impediment of "fixed" programming code.
Important: For the purpose of determining the C&C effects of friendly FOG, please, ignore Mr. Tiller's "Command Value" rating - i.e., the upper letter tag on a leader unit's icon, used by Mr. Tiller to determine rally / morale die-roll checks.
General Rule: The Leadership Value rating is the lower letter assignment on a leader unit's icon, albeit a subjective, static qualifier. The Leadership value herein will measure applicable effects of 'friendly' FOG on movement and offensive fire/melee operations.
Notes to Review:
Brig. Gen. J. Pettigrew Brig. Gen. J. Davis Brig. Gen. S. Meredith Brig. Gen. L. Cutler
General Rule: A Brigade officer's base [default] "Command Range" is 3 hexes for CSA and 2 hexes for USA. The base brigade command range is the maximum, unadjusted number of hexes that a unit may be from its brigade officer in order to freely move and conduct offensive fire and melee assaults -- but, also see "Enhanced Command Range" II.A._2..
An officer's CR may never extend through impassable terrain or un-crossable river or creek hex/hex-side .
Infantry and cavalry function most efficiently when in Command Range of their brigadiers. Artillery and wagons operate independently. --R. Berg
Units not In Command are forced to act individually. -- R. Berg
. . . [as opposed to Mr. Tiller's 200 foot piece-de-fiction], which permits each and every unit on the map to behave as if directly wired to their Army HQ, fantastically unfettered and free to move as if wholly independent of any chain-of-command - coordinating maneuver, defense, and attack across the breadth and expanse of any battlefield with absolute self-assurance and towering self-control so long as the morale check can be avoided - avoided, at least, until the moment(s) of decision.
To date, Mr. Tiller's program has failed to shed a critical, revealing light on the otherwise crippling effects of "Friendly FOG" on the seldom if ever so predictable cooperation and coordination of all brigade, division, corps, and army troop maneuvers upon a 19th century battlefield. The command line between heavy-handed, control-freaking 200 foot micro-management and the world of make-believe 'historical' re-creation remains virtually indistinguishable in Mr. Tiller's games, from Talonsoft's Battleground to the current HPS campaign series of Civil War Battles.
Now more than a decade later, Mr. Tillers' 200 foot reliance on a "command and control" fantasy model, and, for all intents, a missing-in-action AI opponent, doesn't mean that his play-by-email sub-routine isn't still a gamey contest of individual wills, requisite patience, and anal-retentive piece-pushing; but these games - as played 'out of the box' - can never be taken seriously as historical, let alone educational, instructive exercises by the sober.





Brig. Gen. J. Archer Brig. Gen. A. Iverson Brig. Gen. J.S. Bowen Col. T. Devin Brig. Gen. T. Rowley
General Rule: A Brigade officer's "leadership value" rating (i.e., the lower letter on a leader's icon) may increase an officer's base command range.
EXAMPLES:
In this way, a long column of men can still be controlled by one leader. -- R. Berg
General Rule: Units in Road Column Formation may move without being in the immediate Command Range of their leader until the turn after they change formation - at which time all Section II ACW House Rule Essentials - 'friendly FOG' - qualifiers are conspicuously applied.
To Review:
Division Commanders are responsible for the unrestricted movement and [optional] detachment / attachment of subordinate brigades.




Please, review "Road Column" Formation which permits maximum "in command" movement of an entire Division in Road Column formation.
General Rule: A Division commander's base "Command Range" (CR) is 6 hexes for the CSA and 4 hexes for the USA.
The base CR is the maximum (unadjusted) number of hexes that a subordinate brigade officer may be from his Division commander in order to move freely.
Reminder: While an out-of-command Brigade Officer unit may only move one hex in a given turn, combat units under his command that begin the movement phase within his "command range" may always move up to their full MP allowance.



Maj. Gen. H. Heth Maj. Gen. W. Pender Brig. Gen. J. Wadsworth Maj. Gen. A. Doubleday
General Rule: A Division Commander's "leadership value" rating (i.e., the lower letter on a leader's icon) may increase the commander's base command range.
EXAMPLES:



Maj. Gen. M. Lovell Maj. Gen. D. Birney Brig. Gen. J. Buford
General Rule: A Division commander is assigned "Command Points" (CP's) relative to his "Leadership Value" rating. CP's serve to increase a subordinate officer's base command range and/or permit the "detachment" / "attachment" of a subordinate brigade -- please, see II.B.4. below.
Important: USA Division commanders must begin the movement phase within the command range of their Corps / District commander (or within 3 hexes of the Army Commander as per II.C.4. below) in order to eligible to allocate CP's.
Caution: CP's allocated to extend the command range of a subordinate officer only remains in effect for the current player turn. In subsequent turns, CP's must continue to be re-allocated in order to maintain a subordinate brigade officer's extended command range.
EXAMPLES:
Reminder: A Division commander may never expend more than 1 CP to "detach" / "attach" a brigade in any given turn.
General Rule: Attaching or detaching brigades / divisions is a voluntary action. There is no limit as to how long a subordinate command may remain detached.
EXAMPLE:
Brig. Gen Heth (CSA) may voluntarily reduce his command to a minimum of 3 brigades or increase his command to a maximum of 5 brigades at any time, during play.
Additional Examples:


Maj. Gen. H. Heth Maj. Gen. S. Hurlbut
A Corps / District / Wing Commander's base command range (CR) is 8 hexes. A commander's CR may never extend through impassable terrain or an un-crossable river or creek hex-side / hex.
Important: Please, ignore Mr. Tiller's default "command radius" of 15 hexes assigned to his Corps leaders, as per his parameter data, when determining the impact of 'friendly' FOG on corps level command & control.
Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill Lt. Gen. J. Longstreet Brig. Gen. W.T. Sherman Maj. Gen. G. Meade (AOP)
"Memphis District,"1862 3:00 a.m. June 28, 1863
General Rule: A combat unit / brigade or division officer that begins the movement phase stacked with or adjacent to its designated District / Corps / Wing Commander always enjoys "in command" status.
Note: Where no Corps commander is present on the battlefield (e.g., Campaign Corinth, etc.), a "District" commander (e.g. Brig. Gen. W.T. Sherman - "Memphis District," Maj. Gen. Ord - "Jackson District," etc., ) may satisfy the U.S.A. Division Commander's "in command" requirement (to be eligible to detach / attach a subordinate brigade officer).
Exception: Please, see II.E.2. - "'Separated' / Leaderless Reinforcements".
Reminder: CSA divisions and only "detached" USA division(s) behave as "independent" commands.


Maj. Gen. E. Ord Maj. Gen W.S. Hancock Lt. Gen. R.S. Ewell
"Jackson District"
EXAMPLES:
Suggestion: Gen. Hill's "B" leadership value is arguably too high, recognizing not only his new Corps command status (as yet unproven), but an untimely, weakened physical condition at the time of battle. Players may agree to manually tweak the OOB, keeping written records of any change(s) to Leadership Value ratings. By our immediate example, Gen. A.P.Hill's Leadership Value rating would be downgraded to "C" (possibly even a "D" ?) rating, during the course of the three day battle of Gettysburg.
Col. H. Berdan Berdan's 1st U.S. Sharpshooters Col. N. "Shank" Evans
National Civil War Association Bull Run '61 - Antietam '62
General Rule: Detached (i.e. " Independent") combat units, brigade officers, and division commanders always operate as if they were "in command".
General Rule: Regiments, Brigades, and Divisions sometimes enter the game separated (out-of-command) from any parent / superior organization. Special rules are required to address a somewhat inconvenient situation.
Please, also see Scenario OOB Exceptions (Section XIV) for First Manassas / Bull Run OOB (1861) global Command and Control exceptions - where no Corps leaders exist for either side - and where USA Division leaders / CSA Brigade officers are directly linked to their "Overall Field Commander".
Reminder: Mounted cavalry are never required to be "in command" in order to move freely as per Section II.A.1. ( Exceptions 'i' ).
Introduction
There are several "what-if" (fantasy) scenarios within the Gettysburg Campaign game wherein a Union Corps (e.g., VIII Corps) enters the game with a number of "separated" (i.e., leaderless / out-of-command brigades), or in the case of USA Doubleday's division, an entire "separated" division.
ACW House Rule Essentials™ requires that a "separated" formation be treated under a modified "out-0f-command" set of guide-less - necessary to contest Mr. Tiller's otherwise "200 Foot" run amok (careless) behemoth from growing ever more a-historic.
* An objective hex is defined as any mutually-agreed upon hex-of-interest; i.e.,
Notes:
. . . to the tune of the Rogue's March.

"A federal soldier, guilty of breaking Army regulations, is
paraded through the streets of Washington." 17
"Whilst looking for a Governmental solution, the Military reluctantly came clean to the real reason - desertion, or to be accurate 'the lack of response to desertion'.
"A totally independent force was needed that was specially designed and equipped for the task.
"Provosts were required to be horse soldiers, although still infantry . . . They were self sufficient . . . They were to become hated by all within the Union forces. They were insubordinate and . . . It was not safe for them to billet near regular units and would be kept out of sight in conflict areas. Although not wanted, they were much needed, not only for [a] deserters [n' stragglers?!]. They were responsible for [b] movement of spies in and out of Union lines, [c] securing routes for civilian refugees, [d] the protection of Military key points, [e] guarding of Division H.Q. Personnel, and [f] the draft."
--An informative brief by Bob George, December, 2000: The Provost Guard
Leader Escorts like Provost troops are included in Mr. Tiller's latest OOB's, but like miniature bits of dreamy confection or divine window-dressing, they serve no specialized function in the game. What a darn historical . . . sham---e.
ACW House Rule Essentials™ offers an instructive override to the impediment of hardwired programming neglect by showing provost and escort usage in their more limited, specialized role(s).
Introduction: Provost troops do not / will not voluntarily serve as front-line units. Instead, they serve behind the lines as a "mounted-infantry" reserve, maintaining an ever watchful eye on objective hex(s) - i.e., a key crossroad, bridge, supply depot, etc., etc., along with the usual rounding up of rogue deserters, stragglers, etc..
. . . unless, of course, their position is penetrated / overrun by the enemy.
Coordinating melee assaults (i.e., combining friendly unit SP's willy nilly) in the midst of maneuver, flying lead, limbs, arms and legs, was never so predictable nor absolute as Mr. Tiller's series of games might purport or presuppose to teach.
“Regimental leaders—whether appointed early or elected later—died in astonishing numbers. The necessity of inspiring citizen-soldiers in battle often obliged Civil War commanders to lead from the front, literally advancing with the front line, sometimes waving swords or flags. A worse prospect from the actuarial perspective would be hard to imagine. The advent of rifled muskets had rendered such leadership moot, but military and societal norms only adapted slowly. ...As a consequence, the war killed fully one-quarter of the field-grade officers in line regiments. That ghastly harvest of dead colonels numbered about 50 times greater mortality than among American of like ranks and duties during World War II....” 9
The "strength and suddenness" - of Gen. Jackson's coordinated, albeit somewhat disjointed and confused, assault on the open federal flank - "took XI Corps totally by surprise." 10
Jackson's crushing 'Plank' attack near Taylor House

Chancellorsville, 1830 hrs, May 2, 1863
There are two types of offensive coordinated melee:
Brig. Gen. Buford's 2nd U.S. cavalry regiment executes a bold but unsuccessful
late afternoon charge against Brig. Gen. WHF
Lee's artillery supported brigade.
"The battle of Brandy Station 'made the Federal cavalry'." --H.McClellan 5
General Rule: Units stacked in a hex may combine SP's to conduct a single stack coordinated melee so long as all participating units begin the movement phase "in command".
Note: A unit may not conduct offensive fire into one hex, and initiate melee into a different hex in the same turn.
Example: 52nd NC (Pettigrew), 5th Ala & 13th Ala (Archer) begin the movement phase stationed in separate hexes. They end the movement phase, stacked within a single hex adjacent to a curiously static enemy unit. All attacking units meet the general rule qualification of beginning the movement phase "in command," therefore, all units remain eligible to combine their SP's into a "single-hex" coordinated melee.
General Rule: Units in two or more hexes may only combine melee SP's into a multiple-hex coordinated melee if all participating combat units and officers begin their movement phase "in command" -- i.e., within the "command range" of their designated brigade and division officer(s).
Reminder: All Brigade officer(s) participating in a multiple-hex coordinated melee must begin their movement phase in command - i.e., within the "command range" of their respective Division commander(s).
Note: Under Berg's GBACW boardgame rules, all units that are not stacked with a leader are required to undergo a die-roll morale check to determine "melee eligibility." Units that fail a morale check may not initiate melee for the remainder of the turn. Additionally, stacks that are ordered to melee, may only resolve melee attacks, one stack at a time. A defending hex may therefore routinely undergo one or more [stacked] melee assaults in the same turn. (source: River of Death)
The 118th Pennsylvania -- Boteler's Ford

--September 20, 1862
Gen. Porter (V Corps) launches a lackluster 3 brigade pursuit of Lee's retreating army across the Potomac, while back along the receding Antietam, Gen. McClellan mulls over the shifty political winds of opportunity in '64 even as Lincoln advises Little Mac to press his assumed, if but observably fleeting, advantage? 1
ACW House Rule Essentials™ targets Mr. Tiller's glossed-over, one-size-fits-all column formation by creating an independently defined "Road" column vs "Shock" column pair of complements.
General Rule: A unit in column that uses (i.e., benefits from) the pike, road, trail movement rate at any time during its movement phase is defined as being in Road Column formation. Such unit(s) may not initiate melee in the same turn.
Example: In clear terrain, an infantry unit in column formation beginning its movement phase with 12 MP's may move no more than 6 clear terrain hexes to remain eligible for offensive melee orders in the same turn.
Note: Treat units that rout behind enemy lines as "isolated" units. As a result if they move they must do so in an effort to return to friendly lines asap (see II. g. above).
A unit in Skirmish Formation may only conduct melee against the following units:
Col. William Gamble's 1st Brigade

Under morning orders from Gen. Buford, Gamble's troopers dismount to assume a
defensive line, stretching 1000 yards along the east
bank of Willoughby Run. --July 1, 1863 5
Introduction: USA cavalry (especially early in the war) were trained to function most effectively as "mounted infantry" -- in effect they were mobile / swift-of-hoof foot soldiers. By historical comparison,
"CSA cavalry units were [typically] neither trained to, nor adept at, fighting dismounted. They were raiders and 'chargers'. Their Cohesion ratings, were they to dismount, would be so low as to make such a tactical choice prohibitive." --R. Berg, River of Death
Note: It is suggested that players provide House Rule exceptions - i.e special qualifiers - to address special unit capabilities specific to your current OOB -- e.g., Gen. N. Forrest, whose "mounted infantry " proved a promising exception to the CSA cavalry doctrine rule; whereas mounted provost guards, etc., might be limited to mounted defensive operations -- i.e., they would not be allowed to initiate melee and/or dismount to form normal battle-line, if only because they did not historically perform conventional "foot soldier" infantry tactics, yes?
Observation: Mr. Tiller's "melee quality" setup option serves an unqualified "global" modifier for all "A" & "B" quality units, including all cavalry units without exception. The global 'bonus' provision must be dismissed wholesale, if only because Mr. Tiller's model fails to differentiate between typical cavalry vs infantry military doctrine. In other words, to permit dismounted cavalry to -- without exception or qualification, enjoy the same, identical melee bonus as line / "shock" infantry is unacceptable - as it a-historically skewers period cavalry doctrine.
General Rule: ACW House Rule Essentials™ requires that the "melee quality" option at game setup be disabled.
Reminder: Dismounted Cavalry, numbering 100 SP's or less, are automatically treated as skirmishers - please, review Skirmishers (XII. A. 1.).
Design Note: In Richard Berg's Gleam of Bayonets (Antietam), by only one example, a "B" quality mounted cavalry unit immediately becomes a "D" quality unit upon dismounting. The troop quality reduction not only reduces a dismounted unit's morale / rally capability, but it is also recognized that the dismounted unit is typically ill-equipped and/or psychologically unprepared to go toe to toe, let alone conduct offensive melee against line / "shock" infantry troops.
"The skirmish line is in advance, with the main body behind. Mounted companies are stationed on one or both flanks." 11

The initial Confederate Advance by Heth's Division in the early morning hours of July 1, 1863, was not conducted as aggressively as the Confederate Player is likely to do in the game. Additionally, Buford's troopers were deployed as skirmishers, rather than in a true line formation. --R. Berg
Use of this house rules section is not intended to adversely affect the rate of the Confederate advance, but it seeks to reduce the a-historical number of casualties suffered on both sides, acknowledging Buford's casualties, alone, were less than 200 men for the entire morning's battle (Buford's troopers being withdrawn for the remainder of the Gettysburg battle at around 1300 hours, July 1).
ACW Campaign House Rule Essentials™ strives to model an essential, albeit token, defensive fire benefit for dismounted cavalry in skirmisher formation, defending against enemy fire and/or melee.
Note: For a complete summary of the Skirmish Formation, please, see XII. Skirmishers.
General Rule: A Skirmisher may never stack with another combat unit except artillery or leader unit.
-- In other words, a unit must either move and/or change its facing, thereby expending at least 1 MP, to become eligible to fire at a unit enjoying skirmish formation status.
Important! A Dismounted Skirmisher unit receives no defensive benefit consideration when fired upon during the enemy defensive fire phase. Given hardwired constraints, this is seen - and play-tested - as a necessary restriction to prevent the defensive-oriented skirmisher unit from being asymmetrically employed in an a-historically offensive manner.
An in command Dismounted Skirmisher may initiate melee vs the following units:
Notes:
In Mr. Tiller's game, a skirmisher unit is penalized by having 100 sp's subtracted from its fire combat strength during a friendly fire phase - thereby 'simulating' "skirmisher formation." This is acceptable. However, that a unit in skirmish formation receives no defensive benefit whatsoever vs enemy fire - for being in a more loosely arranged "skirmisher" formation is not.
Additionally, to penalize skirmishers for moving through adverse terrain (woods, etc.) as opposed to 'normal' movement rates for more stiffly orchestrate line/column units makes no sense. While the bivouac agrees that the "recon" feature was needed, Mr. Tiller's ACW "skirmisher" model fails to simulate a tactical reality. It is a programming expedient-of-least-resistance that does nothing to show war gamers how a unit in Skirmish Formation, whether infantry and/or dismounted cavalry, historically functioned. One can put to test such a sorry observation and conclusion by simply attempting to simulate Buford's delay tactics on the morning of July 1 while employing Mr. Tiller's "skirmisher" formation . . . .
A Retreat Before Melee option provides a token survivability factor for Dismounted cavalry in Skirmish Formation.Important:
- All Dismounted cavalry in Skirmish formation may exercise option ' 1' below - be sure to include small units that qualify as per XII.A. 1 .
- Option '2' - while more laborious - more closely approximates Berg's original Retreat Before Melee routine.
The "Retreat Before Melee" (RBM) option targets the survivability of dismounted cavalry units that have been ordered to "Skirmish" with the enemy - i.e., hit / delay / fall-back - while avoiding melee with enemy line / "shock" troops whenever possible. That Mr. Tiller's cavalry may both initiate and similarly invite dismounted cavalry in Skirmish Formation vs line infantry melee combat, without tactical distinction or qualification, is a tactical lesson in fiction?
The following is a [gross] simplification of Berg's GBACW rule, given "fixed" programming constraints.
General Rule: A Dismounted Cavalry unit in "Skirmish" Formation need not be in command to exercise its "Retreat Before Melee"(RBM) option.
Exception: If a Dismounted Cavalry has been deployed in a wooded terrain hex, then (c) herein is ignored and (a) above still applies, due to the crippling effect Mr. Tiller's routine has on skirmisher movement capability - a complete '180' to how a unit in loose / skirmish order should be able to conduct tactical maneuvers.
A "Retreat Before Melee" option in the spirit of Berg's original boardgame design, albeit not so transparent or effortless to effect.
General Rule: Dismounted Cavalry units in "Skirmish" Formation - please, also be sure to review XII.A._1. - and targeted for melee may exercise the Retreat Before Melee.
Routine Checklist
Note: Obviously, steps 'a' & 'b' as outlined above will force additional delays upon commanders. This delay alone should discourage all but the grumpi-ss among-ss.
"Wilder's rapid-firing horseback infantry" 6
Tullahoma Campaign, June 27 1863
While CSA cavalry were typically trained to perform as "raiders and chargers", USA cavalry troopers, like Col. John T. Wilder's "Lightning Brigade," proved especially valuable as hard-riding foot soldiers -- already dubbed 'The Lightning Brigade' as a result of their rapid seizure of Hoover's Gap on the opening day of the campaign. 6
Note: House Rule qualifiers may be inserted, specific to your current OOB, disqualifying such units -- by examples, Wilder's mounted "foot soldiers," provost [horseback] guards, etc. -- from initiating a "Mounted Line" (melee) charge.
Mounted cavalry were the 'eyes and ears' of the army, and, yet if historically employed for the purpose of forward reconnaissance, they invite self-immolation under Mr. Tiller's crippling (paralyzing) phase/turn-based 'rules of engagement'.
Suggestion: It is recommended that the Mounted Reconnaissance option be used within the context of Mr. Tiller's phase-based game -- i.e. check only the "Manual Defensive Fire" set-up option prior to play. Even so, "Mounted Reconnaissance" may prove worthy of review and inclusion in a turn-based game.
The bivouac also recommends selecting Mr. Tiller's recent Mounted Cavalry Skirmisher game setup option addition as per Appendix ii.
General Rule: Mounted Reconnaissance formation is defined as a cavalry unit in "column" formation, which executes and ends all movement during the initial Mounted Reconnaissance Movement (MRM) phase in a previously unspotted enemy unit's LOS.
However, a mounted cavalry unit that ends its movement during the MRM phase in the direct LOS of a previously unspotted enemy unit -- but beyond the ranged fire of enemy guns / small-arms -- shall fail to qualify as "mounted reconnaissance" and is treated as normal mounted cavalry.
10-13-07 Addition -- Mounted Cavalry Skirmishers (Optional)
Players employing the Mounted Skirmisher option shall recognize that revealed '?' enemy locations constitute a spotted unit. Thus a mounted cavalry unit that ends movement within two (2) hexes of a spotted enemy unit fails to qualify as a cavalry unit engaging in
Mounted Reconnaissance," hence, is treated as per normal cavalry rules.
Example: a) At the beginning of the 8:20 a.m. turn, during the initial MRM phase -- i.e. prior to all normal friendly movement -- the phasing player voluntarily deploys "mounted reconnaissance" unit(s) for the purpose of intelligence-gathering. b) At the end of the MRM phase, any enemy units that become visible ("spotted") as a result of mounted cavalry movement plots, during the preceding MRM phase, shall define such cavalry as "mounted reconnaissance," therefore, requiring additional treatment as outlined below (please, see "2" and "3" below).
Note: If playing with the "auto-def" fire routine enabled, and if perchance the routine fails to execute its "auto-def" fire, the mounted reconnaissance unit will, in effect, get away without so much as a scrape - via mandatory withdrawal in its following movement phase. Life -- and cheating death -- is always 'fair' game. Se la vie.
(i) Mounted cavalry that move during the normal friendly movement phase -- i.e., after all Mounted Reconnaissance Movement has been completed and the normal movement is underway -- are treated as normal cavalry in column and/ or "mounted line" formation (please, see V.B. below); to be sure, they no longer qualify as "mounted reconnaissance".
(ii) "Disrupted" cavalry may not conduct "mounted reconnaissance" operations .
(iii) Leaders may not assume "mounted reconnaissance" duty although may still provide intelligence-gathering, during the normal movement phase.(iv) Mounted Reconnaissance units may not initiate melee.
(v) Of course, any eligible (see "iv" exception above) enemy unit that enters an unspotted mounted cavalry unit's ZOC may conduct fire / melee combat as per normal play (because only mounted cavalry that are ordered to move in their own friendly Mounted Reconnaissance Movement Phase shall qualify as "mounted reconnaissance").
Notes:
Observation: "Mounted Skirmisher" (Reconnaissance) formation increases unit survivability, contesting the senseless, a-historical slaughter of mounted troopers, who are fixed in place, during the enemy defensive / offensive fire and melee phases, apparently lacking a sure sense of urgency to withdraw upon initial sighting / contact with the enemy.
Suggestion: Scott Hamilton's aged (but venerable) phase-based Aide-de-Camp II shows a workable solution: a movement-triggered LOS (Line-of-Sight) refresh routine. --see Appendix iii - "Show Don't Tell" Wish List - 'Real-Time' Spotting Routine (scroll down about 1/3).
Col. J. Kilpatrick's cavalry, in line formation, charges rebel battery.
Richmond vicinity, May 3, 1863 12
General Rule: Only cavalry in Mounted Line formation may initiate melee -- but see exceptions III.B. 4. a. (Miscellaneous Melee Qualifiers)
Mounted Line formation is defined as a cavalry unit in column formation with the additional qualifiers and critical restrictions below:
Example: A cavalry unit, beginning its movement phase with 24 MP's, may move up to a total of 12 clear terrain hexes (i.e., expending 2 MP's per hex) in order to remain eligible to charge/melee in the same turn -- please, review V.B. #2. below for further qualifiers/restrictions.
Reminder: All charge / melee movement per hex is calculated -- manually -- at the off-road terrain movement rate in order to retain melee eligibility in the same turn.
An idealized 'last hurrah'!

Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart --Yellow Tavern, May 11, 1864
Phase-based qualifying essentials to the "manual defensive fire" setup option
General Rule: A combat unit that conducts a voluntary withdrawal from an enemy zone-of-control hex has its MP allowance halved. The friction exhibited by hostile adjacent enemy ZOC's defines the tactical pin.
Example: An unlimbered gun that limbers under the cover of a infantry unit in line ignores the enemy pin.
General Rule: A unit's Field-of-Fire (FoF) front extends outward two hexes from its pre-defined 3 hex-side ZOC front. There is no movement point penalty cost to enter an enemy unit's FoF front.
Examples:
A multi-legged pair of tactical mods to the "automated-defensive fire" turn-based game.*
"Pontoons" . . . Confederate-style
shoeless infantry from Ewell's II Corps wade north to Pennsylvania. 5
* While having the appearance of an oxymoron, (1) un-check "Manual" Defensive Fire while checking "Automated" Defensive Fire setup options OR (2) un-check both "Manual" and "Automated" Defensive Fire setup options to create a "turn-based" game. (If these setup instructions make sense to you, there may be a job for you in Pentagon Sales and Promotions, calling for some darkside-of-the-moon-based Star Wars Missile Defense program, targeting rampant gravity-defying jhadists, fence-walking fruit-pickers, and rehabbing teen pop stars.)
Update (5-4-08): "Optional Melee Resolution"
Kudos! for Mr. Tiller's recent "Optional Melee Resolution" game setup option addition, which borrows at below wholesale prices (i.e., at no cost and no credit to no one ;-)) from section "VII. B." below.
The following qualifiers serve to restore a perceived imbalance to Mr. Tiller's original phase-based design while still permitting accelerated game play speed -- if speed-of-play is a priority.
Note: A Cavalry unit may both dismount and form skirmishers during the movement phase -- however, as per '2' above, it may move no further in the same turn.
All units may change formation at any time during the Friendly Movement Phase.
Observation: While the standard (unmodified) "turn-based" game rather dramatically accelerates pbem exchanges, House Rule consensus holds that this increase is at the expense of undermining Mr. Tiller's 'original' phase-based design complements.
As an option to weigh, however, the standard turn-based game nonetheless remains viable, if only because the "blitzkrieg" turn-based style of play can, still, prove a-historically-skewered "fun" for those less concerned with complementary / consistent game design.
If enemy guns can be captured, recapture too must be an option.
CSA Gen. Manigault captures four 20-lbr Parrotts, Atlanta, July 1864". . . In less than 30 minutes, the Federals had closed the gap and restored XV Corps's original lines, recovering eight of the 10 lost artillery pieces . . . [and] recaptured DeGross' [4] 20-pounder parrotts and turned them on the Confederates." 13
Update: Shiloh 1.03c includes a "captured" artillery patch in progress. Section XIII Artillery Capture house rules remain archived herein as original source reference material.
This house rule essentially acknowledges a missing time element that it demonstrably takes to successfully spike and/or remove captured ordnance from a live battlefield situation. Heavy ordnance simply don't 'up and away' without a trace as Mr. Tiller's model rather hastily suggests.
General Rule: A unit may not melee unlimbered enemy guns on the same turn it enters a hex adjacent to an artillery unit. It may, however, elect to melee the gun(s) on any subsequent turn without qualification, so long as the unit does not move.
If an eligible melee unit moves away from the enemy gun hex for whatever reason, it must re-qualify for melee all over again as per the General Rule.
Note: Under Richard Berg's GBACW rules, artillery guns have a separate, complementary crew unit assigned to a specified section/battery. Under Berg's rules, for an unlimbered gun to be successfully captured, a unit must successfully melee the gun unit hex AND then remain in the gun hex for two consecutive turns before the gun(s) may be removed from the map with appropriate victory points assessed.
"Guards of a Union supply train try to beat back an attack by Confederate cavalrymen,
visible under the trees . . . Rosecrans relied on infantry to protect his supply wagons." 3
General rule: Wagons may not be advanced to occupy front line hexes - no ands, ifs, or muskets.
This House Rule targets an observed abuse and/or misuse of supply wagon(s), whereby one or more are intentionally deployed to the front as sacrificial fodder if only to retard an anticipated, or otherwise immediate breach in one's line.
Note: Allowing an advancing attacker to automatically "overrun" front-line wagon 'abatis' would "fix their wagons" so to speak, yes? But, until then - whereby Mr. Tiller makes the automatic overrun happen, we favor use of the current house rule restriction on wagons being deployed as 'mobile impedimenta'.
Major, my men have sometimes failed to take a position, but to defend one, never! --Stonewall Jackson, 1862
General Rule: Breastworks may only be constructed in a hex that is within three hexes of a . . .
Breastworks may not, however, be constructed in a town or marsh hex.
Wounded confederates surrender

Crampton's Gap, September 14, 1862 2
General Rule: Providing the enemy with surrender terms is strictly optional.
Notes:
a) Requiring a surrendered unit to return to its own rear prevents the unit from unwittingly serving as a spotter and/or proving a hindrance or impediment of any kind to enemy movement, battle intentions, etc..
b) A surrendering unit must not be allowed to block enemy / friendly road movement.
c) A surrendering unit's ZOC that faces away from the enemy is less likely to impede enemy intentions.
Concluding Observation
While no surrender VP's are gained (or lost) by either side, the player dictating surrender terms nonetheless has the satisfaction of knowing that the surrendering unit is knocked out of action for the duration of the battle, while at the same time enjoying a civil measure of good karma by sparing the lives of countless virtual troopers' to otherwise arbitrary, wholesale slaughter - possibly the result of pursuing sometimes questionably (dishonorably) gained "VP's".
"Snipers were simply skirmishers who could shoot straight" 18

Skirmish Fire was the alternative to a stand-up firefight between two formed lines at close range. In skirmish fire a relatively small number of troops (one or two companies per regiment) would fan out and take cover individually at a safely long range from the enemy. They would keep up a harassing fire, but not attempt to attack . . . The skirmishers would be very difficult for the enemy to hit, yet their fire would be a considerable nuisance even if it did not actually strike many men.
Skirmishing of this type could be used to keep the enemy in play while a major attack was being assembled, or to screen a move to flank or rear. In the offensive, skirmishers could probe forward to find weak points in the enemy's line. At the end of combat the skirmish screen turned into the army's line of infantry pickets for routine security . . . . --Paddy Griffith 18
'Skirmish' is a formation used to screen densely-packed units behind the skirmish line, or to defend an extended position not in danger of immediate assault. --R. Berg
Important: Treat Mr. Tiller's "Mounted Skirmishers" game play option as per normal game play rules.
Mr. Tiller's latest "Mounted Skirmisher" pile-on creation describes a ubiquitous "one-size-fits-all" tactical abstraction which thinks to serve in a Quantum Mechanics universe wherein (1) a mounted road column formation (2) a mounted melee formation (3) and an 'auto' "mounted skirmisher" formation are all tactically represented by the same, identical formation qualifier.
The bivouac would prefer to see Mr. Tiller differentiate (i.e., show the differences / distinguish between) column, line, and skirmish formation models.
Examples:
The following sample of undersized units are defined and treated as units in permanent Skirmish Formation:
- Col. B.T. Johnson's 4 regiments (Jone's Bde - Jackson's Wing at Antietam) -i.e., 1st VA Btln (53 SP's), 21st VA (68 SP's), 42nd VA (98 SP's), 48th VA (88 SP's)
- Col. Devin's "detached" 9th NY (100 SP's), 6th NY (100 SP's), L-6th NY (35 SP's), 17th PA (100 SP's), A&C 3rd West VA (59 SP's)
- Col. Gamble's "detached" 8th NY (100 SP's), 8th Ill (100 SP's), and 3rd Ind (100 SP's)
Review:
Thus if Skirmish Command Range is maintained, all skirmishers are considered In Command even though some may actually be out of their brigadier's Command Range. In this fashion, an extended line of skirmishers can be maintained efficiently. --R. Berg
General Rule: A unit in Skirmish formation has an SCR of 2 hexes that it may pass along to another unit in Skirmish formation of the same brigade - so long as one of the Skirmisher units also begins its movement phase within the CR (Command Range) of its designated Brigade Officer.
To Review:
Identical to normal combat unit command and control qualifiers, a Skirmish unit must be in command to . . .
. . . to provide for a low density / loose order defensive modifier benefit vs small arms fire for all qualifying line combat units in Skirmish Formation.
General Rule: During the Offensive Fire Phase, a unit in Skirmish formation may only receive small-arms fire if fired upon by an enemy unit that has expended at least 1 MP. In other words, a unit must either move and/or change its facing - thereby expending at least 1 MP - to be eligible to fire at an enemy skirmisher.
[Explanation: By expending at least 1 MP, Mr. Tiller's code modifies offensive fire by a negative 50% modifier. This shift shall serve units in loose order (Skirmish Formation) as an abstracted defensive benefit compromise - until such time as Mr. Tiller provides a favorable low-density modifier complement to his high-density game setup OPTION. (How one might exist without the other is a mystery.) Also, please, see Observation below.]
Reminder: An infantry / dismounted cavalry unit in Line formation, numbering 100 men or less, is always defined and treated as a unit in permanent "Skirmish" formation as per XII. A. 1. .
In Mr. Tiller's game, a skirmisher unit has 100 sp's subtracted from its fire combat strength total during any friendly fire phase. This is satisfactory. However, that a targeted unit in skirmish formation receives no favorable defensive benefit given this identical loose-order formation is not.
Recently, Mr. Tiller provided a negative high density modifier game play OPTION. This is good; but, curiously it's also incomplete, because he leaves out the other half of the equation: A favorable low density modifier .
Why Mr. Tiller has not provided for a favorable skirmisher / small unit formation modifier as the essential complement to his high density model option remains a mystery.
General Rule: A unit in Skirmish formation or line infantry / dismounted cavalry unit numbering 100 men or less as per XII.A.1. has a restricted melee capability.
Reminder: An infantry / dismounted cavalry unit in Line Formation, numbering 100 men or less, is always defined and treated as a unit in permanent "Skirmish" formation as per House Rule XII. A. 1. .
A Retreat Before Melee option provides a token survivability factor for any eligible unit in Skirmish Formation.Important:
- All units in Skirmish formation - be sure to include those that qualify as per XII.A. 1 - may exercise option ' 1' below.
- Only Dismounted Cavalry and Sharpshooter (SS) units may (optionally) exercise option '2' below; and this only assuming players prove agreeable to the more laborious procedure.
Exception: An enemy unit that begins the movement phase within 2 hexes of a Skirmisher unit may be ordered to melee (and conduct offensive fire) in the same turn without restriction or qualification.
A "Retreat Before Melee" option in the spirit of Berg's original boardgame design, which targets the "hack-slash-run" tactic of Dismounted Cavalry and SharpShooter units in Skirmish Formation whose aim is to live to fight another day.
General Rule: Cavalry and Sharpshooter (SS) units in "Skirmish" Formation - please, review XII.A._1. & XII.A. 2. (Optional) - that have been targeted for melee may exercise the Retreat Before Melee option herein.
Routine Checklist
Note: Obviously, steps 'a' & 'b' as outlined below will oblige additional delays upon the natural flow of the game. These delays alone should discourage all but the grumpiest among us.
Section XII (Skirmisher) Notes:
The three major problems with Mr. Tiller's "skirmish" formation model:
. . . are disqualified from forming skirmishers. This is just sad.
Observation - see Appendix iii "Show Don't Tell Wish List":
Without (1) improved "skirmisher" mobility -- especially for woods / rough terrain movement, etc., and (2) improved skirmisher survivability by (as follows) . . .
. . . Mr. Tiller's "skirmisher" currently performs a 2 hex "reconnaissance" function, but fails to effectively "skirmish" in order to live to see another sunrise.
The effectiveness of commands to continue to fight is dependent on how much of a beating their component units have taken. -- Richard Berg (GBACW ©1999)
ACW House Rule Essentials™ require manual oversight for all brigade/division Combat Efficiency (CE) limits. A calculator will serve the vigilant commander, who sees to 'predict' (anticipate) ahead of the fact, applicable brigade/division CE limits.
Formations, suffering CE loss, may be placed in Reserve Status (see Section I.F.) in order to restore a brigade/division's operational status with one further qualification (see XIII.C. below).
Brigade Combat Effectiveness (BCE) is a measurement of the overall morale of each brigade. --R. Berg (Rebel Sabers ©1986)
Note: BCE effects begin at the end of the phase in which a Brigade reaches its CE limit.
Exception: The Iron Brigade (USA) may defy / ignore BCE limits . . . always inviting wholesale immolation to surrender?
Note: DCE effects begin at the end of the phase in which a Division reaches its CE limit.
Examples:
Notes:
View a full-scaled, richly detailed, if, perhaps, not entirely accurate account of the battle here: Battle of First Bull Run --by Ted Ballard-- with hour-to-hour map updates.
"None of the leaders at 1st Manassas had experience commanding large bodies of troops; most of them were used to leading regiments or companies. Consequently, many brigades were committed piecemeal; i.e., one regiment at a time. This proved to be a disaster, and was probably the one single telling point in the Union failure." --- First Blood - The First (& Second) Battle of Manassas ©1989 --Richard Berg
General Rule: "There are NO division-level actions at 1st Manassas. The largest unit that can perform an action is a brigade." --Richard Berg, First Blood-The 1st & 2nd Battles of Manassas ©1989
Note: See Col. Samuel P. Heintzelman's Official Report for a revealing account of his "regimental" approach to command of the 3rd Division at Bull Run on July 21, 1861.
"The command check is made relative to the commanders present on the map at the time of the check. So if you remove a commander at a particular level, then the command check will be made for his subordinates relative to any superior commanders present at the time." --John Tiller, 7-13-08Note: By removing the Union division level commanders from the map, all U.S.A. brigades are directly subordinate to McDowell's 12-hex command range "in command" qualifiers - thus leveling the playing field between the joint CSA command of Beauregard and Johnston - both having a 6-hex command range over troops directly under their command - i.e., Johnston has direct command over Jackson, Bee, Bartow, and Bonham; while Beauregard has command over all remaining CSA brigades on the map. Neither command overlaps.
I Felt myself to be a horse who's ordered to gallop while still hitched to a post. --General Irvin McDowell
Note: Burnside (Hunter) reached Sudley Ford around 9:15 AM. The shift in deployment (from Scenario 103) complements this fact. The following setup more or less commits the Union player to try and re-create McDowell's brilliant strategic opening flank maneuver.
Notes:
USA
i. 4th Michigan (Wilcox) is removed from play, because his regiment "... was detached for rear-guard duty at Fairfax. Several games have this unit popping up at a wild variety of locations and times. The Official Records indicate that it never left Fairfax and was not involved in the battle" --R. Berg.
ii. Richardson's brigade (Tyler) begins "attached" to Col Miles division and assigned a defensive position along the Manassas-Centreville Road near the Butler house.
iii. Montgomery's brigade (BG Runyon) may arrive as reinforcements late in the day.
iv. Because the program's "In Command" Division leader bonus is only available to the Union side, this a-historically / inaccurately skewers play in favor of the Union player by a 3:2 "in command" bonus ratio advantage.Given the chain-of-command protocol, we provide two possible options to correct this imbalance - please, see # 1 and #2 above. In all cases, however, these decisions have been left up to each team of players to determine as they historically or a-historically see fit.
v. Howard's brigade (Heintzelman) is strongly encouraged to continue along the Sudley Ford path of his Division as per the historical march, but again this decision is left up to each team of players to determine.
CSA
i. Jones' brigade was the only confederate force that pushed across Bull Run as per Beauregard's confusing (!) , ever-changing early morning instructions. (Ewell and Holmes never knew exactly what was expected of them so remained "in reserve".)
ii. 9 GA (Bartow) never arrived on the Manassas battlefield - having been left behind in the Shenandoah, hence, has been removed from the map.iii. Bee's 6th NC should arrive near the battlefield just after 12 Noon as per reinforcement schedule.
iv. Roger's battery, assigned to Col. Cocke's brigade included Heaton's section - which is represented by one of Roger's three sections. Davidson's section (Latham's Arty - Cocke) has been deployed north of Evans position near the Carter Mansion as per Berg's OOB.v. 1st VA "Unattached" is Col. J.E.B. Stuart (but unidentified in the game.)
vi. BG E.K. Smith's senior Colonel Arnold Elzy was returned to the officer replacement pool (for now), if only because Smith - although wounded in the climactic early afternoon battle near the Henry house, began the day in fit and healthy fighting spirits.
vii. According to Early's narrative, he was ordered to move to reinforce the left "between 12 n. and 1 p.m." In game terms, this won't do if he is to have a chance to arrive near the Chin house before the historical battle's 'climax' (nearing 4:40 p.m.). His "release" time (11 a.m.) has therefore been adjusted to fit within the context of this historical possibility.viii. Bonham remained near Mitchell's throughout the day; while Longstreet's brigade guarded Blackburn's Ford. Bonham, Longstreet, and Jones, however, share a small chance to release, beginning with the 1 PM Turn - since anything should be possible, if not highly probable, especially given the historical context. (note: Bonham and Longstreet eventually received their orders to advance upon Centreville around 5 p.m.. However, there's no absolute guarantee that even this order will see 'the light of day' during play. One can nonetheless keep their fingers crossed.)
Sources:
First Blood--The 1st & 2nd Battles of Manassas, c. 1990 -- Richard Berg's GBACW series.
First Blood - William C. Davis, c. 1983 (Time-Life series) - unfortunately the best book I own on the subject - from a view of the day's events from both sides' perspectives. Battle map details confirm R. Berg's troop deployments at 9:15 AM, July 21.
Lee's Lieutenants --Douglas S. Freeman, c. 1942 (renewed 1970)
Fighting for the Confederacy --E. Porter Alexander, c. 1989
General Jubal A. Early, Narrative of the War Between the States, c. 1989
Col. Samuel P. Heintzelman's Official Report
BG Daniel Tyler's Official Report
Report of Brig. Gen. Nathan G. Evans
Battle of First Bull Run --by Ted Ballard
Battle of First Bull Run -- a clean, briskly composed account from Miniature Wargaming
Notes:
"McDowell had clearly studied his Frederick the Great, but he failed to notice that Frederick's grand flank attacks had usually relied upon an exceptionally well drilled and experienced army. At First Manassas there was no such army available, so the attacks went in piecemeal and ineffectively. Because the Union manoeuvres were more complex and demanding than the Confederate response, they fell apart more quickly ...." -- Battle Tactics of the Civil War, Paddy Griffith, pp 31-32.
Closing Observation
It is strongly recommended that the "in command" morale check "bonus" for Division commanders be disabled for July 21, 1861.
To "disable" the Union division commanders from play, they must be manually removed from the map. This action will place McDowell's 12-hex chain-of-command radius in a direct link to all subordinate brigade officers within his command radius.
As an alternative, players may agree to "fix" McDowell in place for the duration of play, thus pitting 3 actively engaged Union Division commanders vs 2 division level 'army' officer counterparts in Beauregard and Johnston. We didn't create the OOB - so, we must adapt it as best we might to more historically, hence, accurately re-create the command and control situation, during the first major encounter between northern and southern troops.
Either option shall provide an acceptable compromise for now. That is, at least the playing field will maintain a more historically balanced "in command" morale-check 'bonus' equation for both sides - something which the default game's OOB's curiously fail to provide - acknowledging that it favors the Union "in command" bonus by a 3:2 ratio - which is simply wrong for any time period within the four plus year civil war, but especially so in July of 1861.
[Space Reserved For Next Assignment]
A Users Guide to ACW House Rule Essentials™
General Rule: Players new to house rules are cautioned to "Keep it Simple." It is essential that all commanders be in agreement to each and every house rule employed.
ACW House Rule Essentials™ has evolved over time via 'trial-by-fire' campaign / scenario play. It is suggested that players new to house rules be advised to -
-- One solution for any player who inadvertently commits a house rule violation (blunder?) is to offer some manner of compromise based on the Old Testament "eye for an eye" principle. (Of course, if you discover your opponent 'advertently' - i.e., intentionally - commits a house rule blunder then it is the unwritten House Rule herein that states you may summarily dispatch your foe with all haste, taking no prisoners.)
-- In other words, if YOU commit a house rule transgression during, say, the Movement Phase, you might invite your opponent to freely commit - without penalty - any one-time violation of the house rules in his own immediately following Movement Phase.
--
If the above compromise proves unsatisfactory - perhaps, because the original house rule violation simply proved too decisive to the eventual outcome of a given scenario, then a players' only recourse may be to replay the turn.
Example:
Note: If a player is dissatisfied with any portion of a house rule proposal, then the rule must either be acceptably revised or discarded wholesale prior to play.
Notes: ACW House Rule Essentials™ aim is to provide for an intuitive, transparent, historically-premised overlay to Mr. John Tiller's ACW campaign series of games.
a) In subsequent scenarios, generals may agree to add one (or more) house rule sections. Or not.
b) Either way, remember, any house rule is always open to additions/revisions of the pen, so long as players are 100% in accord to any and all course corrections.
c) Have your version of house rules written down and available for immediate reference during play thus assuring that any question or unanticipated dispute that arises during play can readily be addressed by referencing the source ruling. No fuss no muss.
d) To be sure, for your version of house rules to work, all commanders must be 100% on board with the selected rule options.
e) If a house rule flaw, oversight, and/or exploitable loophole is exposed during game play, players may agree to temporarily suspend play in order to tidy up (i.e., revise-on-the-fly) any portion of a cited rule. When all players are once again in agreement with the rules as posted, the blood-letting may resume . . . but, of course, only in accord to the typically blunt, not particularly subtle, and far too upright - albeit gallant - shoulder-to-shoulder tactics of the day.
ACW House Rule Essentials™ Setup Options
(Recommended)
* For players who opt for the Turn-Based game (i.e., Uncheck "manual defensive fire" while checking "Automatic Defensive Fire," during game setup options prior to play ), the Bivouac recommends Mr. Tiller's "Optional Melee Resolution" game setup option. This option 'borrows' wholesale from ACW House Rule Essentials™ Section VII. B. , which mandates that all movement by the phasing (Turn-Based) player be completed prior to melee combat resolution.
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"Show Don't Tell" Grand-Tactics Wish List
. . . Grand tactics is the art of forming good combinations preliminary to battles as well as during their progress. The guiding principle in tactical combinations, as in those of strategy, is to bring the mass of the force at hand against a part of the opposing army and upon that point the possession of which promises the most important results.19
ACW Tactical / Command & Control Gaming Reflections, c. 1861-1865.
Based on a unit's actual [SP] strength, small units (i.e., 100 SP's plus or minus) will observably exert a proportionally weaker (ZOC) influence than larger units. A Proportional ZOC would spell finis to the otherwise tactically "bogus" '0' movement point global modifier, regardless of how small or ineffectual a combat unit's actual combat fire strength. Units that do not become "disrupted" and/or "pinned" by enemy ZOC fire would be permitted to keep moving. ZOC fire is [optionally] triggered whenever an enemy unit attempts to withdraw from a ZOC.
Note: Scott Hamilton's aging Aide de Camp II provides just such a feature in a modest software package, proving this aint rocket science. How it Works! . . . As a unit moves, the map board may be manually and/or (optionally) automatically refreshed. This feature would finally permit cavalry to serve in their historical role as mounted reconnaissance.
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Dear John, War gamers, respectfully, share in one degree or another Drew Wagenhoffer's acknowledgment that says . . . I suppose you could say that my 'passion' is history. Too, like Brett Shulte's observation, many war gamers doubtless share his hope that "scenarios should be a teaching tool as well as a game . . . " (source: http://www.brettschulte.net/drewwagenhoffer.htm ) As students with a passion for history, then, we must inevitably undertake a review of your game's mistaken [over-looked?] battle-line model. [John, if only because we have neither acknowledged nor addressed the following battle-line issues in any "Design Notes," accompanying any of the games, it is hoped you will review the following observations and questions most specific to your three hex-side battle-line model as it is superimposed over a hex-movement grid. Thank you.] 1. Despite the visible [half-moon] warp created by a hex grid, is your [3-hexside] battle-line intended to example a straight battle line model? "Yes" -- John Tiller, 3-26-03 2. Assuming a straight line model - scaled at 125 yards p/hex with an active ZOC though 3 frontal hex-sides as per the game - and acknowledging, too, that Paddy Griffith notes a 2 rank battle line of 1000 men required a front of approximately 165 yards, etc. (Battle Tactics of the Civil War, 1989), are there any historical sources or physical models that we may have overlooked to explain how a 1000 man battle line might indeed discharge a maximum of 1000 fire-SP's through a single front hex-side, measuring 41.7 yards? 3. Given that two adjacent, opposing "straight" battle lines may be defined as two parallel lines sharing common points along both lines, how is it physically possible for three adjacent stacks of 1000 SP's, sharing common hex-sides to a single enemy unit's front, combine for 3000 SP's and thus fire through their commonly shared hex-sides of 125 yards across (i.e., 3 x 41.7 = 125.1 yards), while the single unit / stack being targeted may return fire through these same common hex-sides with a maximum of 1000 SP's? Have we overlooked something here, John? 4. As a corollary to the above, and given a unit's active ZOC being defined as its three front hex-sides, extending into its three corresponding adjacent hexes, how is it possible for a unit to fire a maximum of 1000 SP's through one hex-side while, at the same time, show an active ZOC through its other two hex-sides? In other words, isn't an active ZOC intended to be a demonstration of available fire power? In other words, if no SP's are left in reserve to cover all three hex-sides to a unit's front how is an active ZOC maintained? A Hopeful, Constructive Suggestion: Would it be possible to expeditiously program a threshold [i.e. "hex-side"] limit on the number of SP's permitted to fire through a single hex-side with the intent of favorably restoring a functional straight line / two opposing parallel battle line equation? Richard Berg's example: Dividing 1000 SP's -- the max. # of SP's allowed in a hex -- by the number of ZOC hex-sides (3), he would arrive at a working 333 1/3 SP's p/hex-side limit [rounded up or down to the nearest incremental, viable integer], given your game scale. Might this formula be 'borrowed', John?
In conclusion, a hex-side threshold limit would at long last redress a battle line's contradictory, unsupportable math. Math which challenges line / hex geometry / history - military manuals, and last but not least war gamers alike, who share a "passion" for history and like to believe that wargame scenarios should be a teaching tool as well as a game. Thank you, John, for your attention and consideration towards this more instructive end. Denny (2-24-03) |
An exchange of emails with Mr. John Tiller (October 23-24, 2006):
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John Writes (10-23-06):
Dear Mr. Tiller,
R.D. Richard |
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Greetings John,
"Forward to Richmond" Denny |
Source References
Appomattox Court House

McClean House on Right
April 9th, 1865
General: I received your note of this morning on the picket-line, whither I had come to meet
you and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with
reference to the surrender of this army. I now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer
contained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose. 14
--R.E. Lee